Ex-director of Energoatom for anti-corruption on Jacob and Halushchenko's prizes, and auctions for the sale of electricity Part 2

The second part of the interview with Oleh Polishchuk, the former head of the Directorate for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption of the State Enterprise NNEGC Energoatom. Corruption scandal with bonuses for vice-presidents Herman Galushchenko and Hartmut Yakob, why does the company sell electricity at unfavorable prices, and did Energoatom really steal UAH 600 million in purchases?

About the end of the investigation of the award given to Halushchenko and Yakob

– In the first part of our conversation, you said about the award, which the acting president President of Energoatom Petr Kotin allegedly illegally gave the vice-presidents Herman Halushchenko and Hartmut Jacob. What is this story?

It became the reason for the process to dismiss me from Energoatom.

On September 21, the mailbox (this is an internal communication channel in Energoatom for reporting violations of the law on the prevention of corruption) received a message that the acting President Kotin, Vice-Presidents Yakob and Halushchenko committed a corruption offense – they illegally seized 560 thousand UAH. Allegedly, Kotin unreasonably paid Halushchenko and Yakob a quarterly bonus for the 2nd quarter of 2020, at a time when they were not entitled to receive such a prize.

A message to the mailbox about the award, which was received by Herman Haluschenko and Hartmut Jacob. Photo courtesy of Kosatka.Media Whistleblower from Energoatom The Energoatom

Quarterly Award is a motivational tool for officials. The quarterly bonus is issued on the basis of the Regulations on bonuses based on the results of work for the quarter. This regulation clearly states that workers who must pass the radiation and nuclear safety exam receive a quarterly bonus after passing these examinations. And in the message they write that they did not pass the exam, but received an award.

In accordance with the job descriptions of the vice-presidents of Energoatom, the latter, in order to obtain admission to independent work, must pass a test of knowledge of the rules, norms and standards on nuclear and radiation safety. This is due to the fact that the decisions of the vice presidents, due to the importance of their position, affect nuclear and radiation safety.

For example, it is necessary to carry out repair work on the block, but there is a budget deficit. And there is one purchase that affects radiation and nuclear safety, while the other does not. You need to make the right decision on what to spend your money on. The VP needs to understand this and know the difference. Why should I pass a knowledge test and get access to independent work.

At Energoatom, the issues of passing knowledge testing are regulated by the Regulations on the Procedure for Testing Knowledge of Rules, Norms and Standards for Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Technical Operation of NNEGC Energoatom's personnel. This is a sectoral document that is being developed by Energoatom and is coordinated with the State Inspectorate for Nuclear Regulation.

According to this Regulation, there are two examination commissions: the internal one consists of Energoatom employees with the participation of an inspector of the nuclear regulator, and the external one under the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine (consists of specialists from the ministry, SNRIU specialists, representatives of Energoatom).

Vice President - senior management position at Energoatom. In fact, he has power over the entire company, except for the president. And he is independent from the president, because in order to fire a vice president, you need a government decision. So, these are independent people who have influence and complete power over all employees of Energoatom, despite their functionality. And in these conceptual conditions that exist in Energoatom, all employees understand that it is the vice presidents who are in control of the situation: they are the vice president, appointed on a permanent basis, and the president is only temporarily acting, the legitimacy is different. In my opinion, this is a significant difference.

If the vice president takes exams in the internal commission, then, in my opinion, he will have a conflict of interest - the exams will be taken by people over whom he has managerial power. In Energoatom, these things are very strongly felt at the level of understanding of subordinates. When Kotin and his team came to Energoatom, in accordance with the Regulation on the procedure for testing knowledge of rules, norms and standards for nuclear and radiation safety, the vice presidents belonged to the category of specialists who pass exams by an external commission under the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine. And the first thing they started their effective activity with was to change the procedure for passing exams by vice presidents. Kotin issued order No. 404 “On the distribution of functional powers between the vice-presidents of the State Enterprise NNEGC Energoatom. And clause 2 of this order determined that the vice-presidents pass exams on radiation and nuclear safety by the internal commission of Energoatom. At the same time, a number of orders were issued to the responsible officials to ensure the appropriate amendments to the production documents, taking into account the priority of this order.

In other words, this order contradicted the Regulations and, accordingly, contradicted the compliance policy. I informed the acting about this. President Kotin. To which he replied that he did not agree with my statement.

In the job descriptions of the vice presidents, the deadline for these exams was set. To pass the exams, the vice presidents were given 4 months from the date of their appointment. Jacob was appointed on May 8, Galushchenko, if I'm not mistaken, on May 12 (according to official information, both were appointed on May 6 – ed.). Accordingly, Jacob had to pass the exams by September 8, and Halushchenko - by September 12.

The section on the procedure for testing knowledge in the job description of Herman Halushchenko. Photo: Oleh Polishchuk

According to the Law of Ukraine "On the Prevention of Corruption", I, as an Ombudsman, have a duty: if a report has been received about a violation of the law on the prevention of corruption by the head of the Company, without a preliminary check, within 3 working days send this information to the NAPK and the Ministry energy. I did just that, at the same time I gave the task to my subordinates to organize a preliminary check, since it was also about the commission of a violation by the vice presidents.

Oleh Polishchuk's message to NAPK about receiving a letter to the trust box. Photo: Oleh Polishchuk

In the register of electronic declarations on the NAPK website in August 2020, messages were published about significant changes in the property status by the company's vice presidents. Halushchenko declared – UAH 278 thousand, Jacob – UAH 255 thousand.

Herman Halushchenko's declaration on the prize received. Photo: public.nazk.gov.ua

Declaration of Hartmut Jacob on the prize received. Photo: public.nazk.gov.ua

On September 23, I wrote a memo to the HR Executive Director Vladislav Yanishevsky, in which I requested information on the date of passing exams by Energoatom's vice presidents, as well as other information about bonuses.

On September 25, I received an answer in which they refused to provide me with information, in terms of the fact that this is the personal data of the vice presidents and without their consent they cannot provide me with this data. According to the Anti-Corruption Program of the State Enterprise NNEGC Energoatom, I, as an Ombudsman, have great powers when conducting an inspection on possible facts of corruption, these powers are unconditional: the need to enter the premises - they must let me in, there is a need to get the original document – they must provide me.

The response of the personnel department about the impossibility of disclosing personal data. Photo: Oleh Polishchuk

Having received such an answer, I was already sure that the accuser was right.

I received indirect information that the vice-presidents of Energoatom received the award for the second quarter inappropriately. But I still did not have a protocol for passing the exams, because the one who was supposed to provide it was simply afraid of reprisals, and therefore wrote nonsense to me. Although I was informed orally that the exams were taken on September 22, 2020 - that is, far after receiving the award and far after the deadlines for passing the exams determined by the job description, and after receiving the quarterly award.

On September 25, Petr Kotin issued an illegal order to send me on a business trip to the Khmelnytsky NPP. It looks like I got them very much. My substantiated explanation about the contradiction of this order to anti-corruption legislation and the Anti-Corruption Program was used as a formal reason for reprimanding me and further illegal dismissal.

Later on the Internet, on one of the sites, a protocol of examinations for September 22, 2020 on the passage of the initial examination of knowledge on radiation and nuclear safety by German Galushchenko and Hartmut Jakob appeared.

That is, the exams took place the next day, after I submitted information to the NAPK and the Ministry of Energy about the violation of anti-corruption legislation. I assume that my activities have already been monitored, and therefore the passing of exams was urgently organized. I have no doubt about the validity of this protocol.

Minutes dated September 22 on the passing of the exam by Halushchenko and Yakob. Photo: informator.press

Having received all the documents indicating the existence of an event of a corruption criminal offense committed by the top management of the State Enterprise NNEGC Energoatom, I sent a statement about the crime to the National Police. Criminal proceedings were started.

A crime statement filed by Oleh Polishchuk with the National Police. Pages 1, 2. Photo: Oleh Polishchuk

On the sale of electricity

- There is an opinion that Energoatom is deliberately trading so strangely in order to import electricity from Russia into the country. Did Energoatom have any discussions on this topic?

During the last 7 months Energoatom has been selling electricity at a loss. There are no trades that would be profitable. The current leadership will certainly deny this. Justifying their legitimacy, they refer to the financial plan of Energoatom, which defines the production cost at the level of 51 kopecks.

As if selling prices are often twice the production cost, and therefore the Company operates efficiently. If we simply come out of the "production cost multiplied by 2", then it is true, very often it happens that Energoatom sells electricity above the production cost and sometimes even twice. But this is manipulation. The problem is that the financial plan does not take into account the scope of assigned Special Responsibilities (SAR). And according to these obligations, 60% of all electricity since August 2020, on the initiative of the Kotin team, Energoatom has been selling electricity for 1 kopeck. for 1 kWh. That is, the remaining 40% of electricity should be sold not twice as expensive, but much higher.

According to financial indicators for 9 months, the total cost, according to Energoatom, is 74 kopecks. We just take the cost of all electricity sold, how much we have produced, we give here administrative costs, sales costs, other operating costs - we get 74 kopecks. It is obvious that any business should proceed from the full cost and profitability, and not from formal manipulation of numbers. But even the sale of electricity, taking into account the full cost price, is not the result to which one should strive, because any company needs profit for development. And profit is the difference between the total cost and the selling price. But the current figures of the financial statements of SE NNEGC Energoatom for 9 months indicate that the Company is constantly selling electricity at a loss. Because there are no sources of coverage of the difference between production and total cost, and even more so no profit.

As if selling prices are often twice the production cost, and therefore the Company operates efficiently. If we simply come out of the "production cost multiplied by 2", then it is true, very often it happens that Energoatom sells electricity above the production cost and sometimes even twice. But this is manipulation. The problem is that the financial plan does not take into account the scope of assigned Special Responsibilities (SAR). And according to these obligations, 60% of all electricity since August 2020, on the initiative of the Kotin team, Energoatom has been selling electricity for 1 kopeck. for 1 kWh. That is, the remaining 40% of electricity should be sold not twice as expensive, but much higher.

According to financial indicators for 9 months, the total cost, according to Energoatom, is 74 kopecks. We just take the cost of all electricity sold, how much we have produced, we give here administrative costs, sales costs, other operating costs - we get 74 kopecks. It is obvious that any business should proceed from the full cost and profitability, and not from formal manipulation of numbers. But even the sale of electricity, taking into account the full cost price, is not the result to which one should strive, because any company needs profit for development. And profit is the difference between the total cost and the selling price. But the current figures of the financial statements of SE NNEGC Energoatom for 9 months indicate that the Company is constantly selling electricity at a loss. Because there are no sources of coverage of the difference between production and total cost, and even more so no profit.

In the team, we talked about this with colleagues, we wondered why this was so.

Recently, the denunciators from Energoatom provided me with an audit certificate for the financial and economic activities of Energoatom Trading (a separate division of Energoatom, which is engaged in the sale of electricity in all market segments). This is a document of the internal audit service of Energoatom, drawn up already during the leadership of Kotin, in December 2020. Internal auditors have documented billions in losses there. These are figures that are close to objectivity.

Fragments of the act of checking the activities of Energoatom trading. Photo: Oleh Polishchuk

And Energoatom is very strange at selling electricity. This all happens chaotically, without clear logic. Let's take October 2020 as an example.

Then the vice president for economics and finance Hartmut Jakob ordered to sell large volumes of electricity for the second half of the month, thereby bringing down prices in the market. Either this is incompetence and unprofessionalism, or is it intent, or is it some anomalous accident, - I hope NABU will answer this. According to my information, while NABU is investigating 4 criminal proceedings that concern the sale of electricity by Energoatom, including the episode with electricity sales in October.

In my opinion, during the seven months of Energoatom's leadership of the Kotin team, a company with an open, transparent, logically understandable in its actions turned into a completely closed one, where a limited number of officials have access to decision-making. And very often these officials, in terms of their functionality, should not have access to these solutions. That is, in my understanding, there is a kind of conceptual and managerial system.

- How does Energoatom generally determine at what price of products to go to auctions? Is there a technique?

At the end of May 2020, at the direction of Kotin, Energoatom conducted an internal investigation into the efficiency of Energoatom Trading (EAT).

When the commission began to analyze the situation, it was found that the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the EAT could not be determined. There is nothing to measure from, there were no KPIs in EAT, there are no regulations that regulate the sale of electricity at a strategic state enterprise.

The commission did not find answers about how EAT sells electricity, how it prepares lots, how it determines them, how it sets prices, which is the minimum profitable price to which the price can be reduced during the auction. It turned out that there is no regulation in the Company that would streamline this activity. When Kotin received the official investigation report for approval, he invited me and asked me to explain the content of the report. Halushchenko was also in his office. I explained to Kotin and Halushchenko that, according to the findings of the commission, the main problem of ineffective sale of electricity is the lack of regulatory procedures for sales. Such an important business process as the sale of electrical energy in all market segments in Energoatom is chaotic and disordered. After all, the market price is formed not only by supply and demand, but also by supply and demand in a specific period of time. And competition also depends on the size of lots, the delivery period, the moment of sale (beginning of the month, middle or end). Energoatom is a legal entity under public law, it operates with public funds, and therefore must have a high responsibility to society and strive to efficiently use these funds.

After my explanations, both Kotin and Halushchenko agreed with the conclusions set out in the official investigation report.

Kotin approved the Internal Investigation Act and instructed Hartmut Jacob and me to develop the necessary proposals to ensure conditions for the efficient sale of electricity, based on the findings of the internal investigation.

The act contained a number of proposals: to develop a sales strategy; consider the formation of an expert group that will accompany the auction; increase the transparency of trading operations; to introduce into the staff of EAT a person authorized for anti-corruption activities.

Several times I attended the auctions for the sale of electric energy in EAT. There, everything happened subjectively from the point of view of the head of the enterprise and is incomprehensible to an outside observer in simple matters. That is, a trader sits at a computer - a responsible person who, through his electronic key, enters the site of the electronic exchange. From a legal point of view, it is this person who is responsible, because it is his signature that will stand under the acceptance. But in reality the whole procedure is led by the head of the EAT. For example, he gives the command: "Reduce by 5 kopecks." "Reducing by another 15 kopecks." “Grinding the lot”, “We enlarging the lot”. Why it was so, it was not clear to me. What is the lowest income limit? What is the margin? Sheer mystery and lack of any logic.

Perhaps the head of EAT reliably knows a clear answer, but cannot explain. And money loves clarity, clarity and transparency. Otherwise, significant corruption risks arise.

Therefore, the most important thing was to develop a transparent and understandable strategy for selling electricity.

But despite the instructions of Kotin, the understanding of the problem by the vice-president for development Halushchenko, today there is no electricity sales strategy in Energoatom. And this is also the result of the conceptual management mode.

There is the Vice President for Economics and Finance, Hartmut Jakob, who is appointed by the Government. He is responsible for the distribution of powers for the direction of electricity trade. But despite the approval of the official investigation act and the instruction of the acting President Petr Kotin on the need to create mechanisms for the effective sale of electrical energy, there was no reaction from Jacob, as well as there was no control over the implementation of Kotin's own instructions.

I addressed in writing to Jacob with a proposal to hold a working meeting to prepare an organizational and administrative document, in order to solve the tasks and existing problems. But the meeting never happened.

It was mid-June 2020. And already at the beginning of July, Kotin unlawfully removed me from the execution of my official powers. During April - August, three leaders were changed at EAT. First, in May, they were forced to write a letter of their own free will to dismiss Sergei Bedin, who created EAT. Then, in June, Roman Sutchenko was laid off, who was Bedin's first deputy and, after his dismissal, acted as the head of EAT. In June, Maxim Zorin was appointed director of EAT, whom, according to the information I have, was invited to the company by German Halushchenko.

For several weeks, Maksym Zorin was in great favor, with him in Energoatom they shot videos, aired. He planned and promoted the implementation of electricity produced at Ukrainian nuclear power plants to the Baltic countries. But already in early August, another official investigation was initiated against Maxim Zorin. Vice President Jacob had some complaints against him. Zorin, like me, was unlawfully removed from the performance of his official powers and he never returned to his duties.

In September, a new general director of EAT, Aleksey Statnik, was appointed, and already in October he came into conflict with Jacob, refusing to follow his dubious instructions on the sale of electricity.

Statnyk opposed Hartmut Jacob's plans to sell large volumes of electricity at the DAM for the second decade of October and wrote his objections to this. He substantiated the economic threats to Energoatom.

Memo of Alexey Statnik, pages 1, 2. Photo: Oleh Polishchuk

Memo of Alexey Statnik, page 3. Photo: Oleh Polishchuk

But after that he was immediately offered to go on vacation, and for the period of vacation Kotin, by his order, entrusted Jacob with the duties of EAT director.

Despite warnings and well-founded threats about possible economic damage to Energoatom, Jacob implemented his plans. According to some experts, as a result of this, in October 2020, Energoatom suffered UAH 240 million in damage in a few days.

Alexey Statnik also did not return from vacation to fulfill his duties. Immediately after that, Kotin reorganized the organizational structure of EAT and the position of the General Director was eliminated. But the post of director was introduced into the staffing table and the performance of duties from December 1, Kotin entrusted the vice-president, Hartmut Jacob.

On December 22, 2020, an auction was held to sell about 15 billion kWh of electricity with a delivery date of 01.01.2021 to 30.06.2021, that is, for six months. The auction was won by a United Energy trader who, according to experts, is a trader in the Privat financial and industrial group.

I received information that this auction was personally run by Vice President Jacob using his dongle. And today, the episode with this auction is also being investigated by NABU. According to preliminary data, the damage to Energoatom as a result of this auction is about UAH 2 billion.

Moreover, Jacob was holding the auction without yet having information for 2021 on the PSO. Only on December 28, 2020, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine made a decision, by which the State Enterprise NNEGC Energoatom continued to perform special duties in March 2021 at a price of UAH 0.15. for 1 kW * h. Taking this into account, the minimum price for 1 kW at the auction on December 21 should have been at least UAH 1.33, but Mr. Jacob sold electricity at a price of UAH 1.16 per 1 kWh.

And already in January 2020, Energoatom does not have the necessary volumes for GarPok as part of PSO project. On this occasion, GarPok addressed its letters to the government, NKREKP, but in the end there is only an aggressive reaction from Energoatom, but no management and personnel decisions at the Government level.

Was Energoatom really plundered in purchases of UAH 600 million

- The media published information about the theft in Energoatom for equipment purchases of UAH 600 million during 2018-2019. Then the technical commission at the tender committee was headed by Petr Kotin. The company confirmed this, but said that it only checked the compliance of the equipment with technical requirements.

Did you know about these purchases and why did they finally take place?

We pay attention to every purchase. The working depth depends on many factors. The basic is the budget, and the second is the participants. At the same time, very complex business processes are simultaneously taking place at Energoatom. On the one hand, it is necessary to put the power units into operation in a timely manner, and on the other hand, it is necessary to purchase the necessary resources financially and effectively use public funds.

According to internal regulations, the service at Energoatom checks the expected cost, the correctness of its formation. In order for the expected value to be determined objectively, it is necessary that this regulation be observed.

According to this regulation, there are five sources of information on the price of purchased products: contacting the manufacturer or its official dealer, if it is a non-resident; the cost of previous purchases; information from various sources on the Internet and on the Prozorro site; and other information that may be in other sources. As a rule, the last two points are rarely triggered, this is due to the specifics of production at nuclear power plants.

And here's an example. I am submitting a request for a quote to the manufacturer. The manufacturer answers - we are glad to cooperate, but please contact our representative. We turn to the representative and he gives an offer with the expected cost.

This is how the expected value process works. As for the purchases you are asking about, in the past there have been purchases for similar items in Energoatom. The prices were about the same. Therefore, there is no reason to say that we used to buy a certain nomenclature conventionally for UAH 10 million, but then suddenly we bought the same item for UAH 20 million.

Of course, the huge number of purchases that take place at Energoatom for hundreds of millions are abused. But now there is a criminal proceeding and it is NABU that is investigating the fact of a probable criminal offense, and if it is proved, the procedure for confiscating criminal property should be applied. Now the criminal proceedings are continuing, Energoatom fully assisted the detectives in the implementation of their procedural duties. But so far there are only a few decisions of the Supreme Anti-Corruption Court in this case, which provided consent to carry out some investigative actions.

Example. As part of the internal investigation, at the request of NABU, I sent a request to the German company Siemens for a commercial proposal for their products. In response, I received a letter from this company stating that they also support compliance, but do not work directly with Ukraine. They have an official representative in Ukraine for all questions on prices, they offered to contact him.

As for the work of the technical commission, in these purchases, Kotin was indeed its chairman. But the information that was released in Energoatom's release as a reaction to the publication in Nashi Groshi is manipulative. Energoatom wrote that a technical commission of eight people was engaged only in technical issues. And they added that this is the period of Nedashkovsky's leadership. But the technical policy of Energoatom is one of the main corruption risks, which are constantly established by the commission for internal assessment of corruption risks. Checking the participant's proposal for compliance with the technical requirements of the Customer is just a corruption-generating environment. And the objectivity of the conclusions of technical specialists very often depends on their virtue. Therefore, from the point of view of prerequisites, this is not just the work of eight specialists, it is, first of all, a corruption-related business process. But I still hope that NABU will objectively complete the investigation in criminal proceedings and the perpetrators, if any, will be justly punished.

The Anti-Corruption Service of Energoatom is not a law enforcement agency. We did not have tools for operational search, wiretapping, mail checking. We have developed and implemented procedures that were supposed to minimize corruption risks. But if company officials enter into a criminal conspiracy and cause damage, then only law enforcement agencies can bring them to justice, in this case it is NABU.

- So you mean that the price of some equipment from the manufacturer cannot be a starting point to consider damage, since there is still a supplier and his interest?

This is exactly what it is. Everyone should receive his own income for his work. Ideally, Energoatom should exclude intermediaries from the supply chain and work directly with product manufacturers. But...

What does the manufacturer say? "Pay 80% in advance and I'll start making." And the budget is always in deficit. And now Energoatom is even credited for salaries. There is no advance payment to the manufacturer, the services of intermediaries with their financial interest are added. Can an intermediary take 100% of the profit margin? The law does not have such restrictions. He can establish 1000% of the profit. It's another matter whether he shared this money with Energoatom officials. And this is already the field of activity of law enforcement agencies. My service at Energoatom has always actively cooperated with law enforcement officers.

About who is in charge of Energoatom

- You said that “Petro Kotin and his team destroyed the anti-corruption system at the enterprise”. Explain, please, what exactly does this mean?

Energoatom, which was as of May 1, 2020, and Energoatom, which are now two different phenomena, not only in terms of economic indicators. First of all, we are talking about the corporate culture, about the environment within Energoatom.

Take not even April 1, when Petr Kotin actually took up his duties (he was appointed on March 29 to the post of acting president), but May 1, when he worked for a month. Herman Halushchenko and Hartmut Jakob had not yet been appointed, but all employees in the Company's Directorate understood that they had influence, because they did not leave Kotin's office. Moreover, Kotin gave a lot of orders in their presence. Personally, he gave me instructions in the presence of Herman Halushchenko, who in April 2020 was not yet vice president. In general, they were prescribed for a long time. It was expected that Halushchenko and Yakob should be appointed vice presidents almost the day after Kotin's appointment. But for almost a month the then acting. Minister of Energy of Ukraine Olga Buslavets did not submit these candidates for consideration at the government meeting. But then she brought it in. There is information that this happened after the intervention of someone from the Office of the President of Ukraine.

In May 2020, when Halushchenko and Yakob were appointed, the Company said that Kotin would move to the post of First Vice President, Technical Director, and Herman Halushchenko would be appointed in his place. And I asked about this in Kotin. And it was very interesting to me that he answered with such a direct speech: “In fact, it does not matter who will sit in this chair. Will I sit here, or someone else - the President of Ukraine handed this company over to us three and the three of us are responsible to him”(meaning Kotin, Halushchenko, Jacob - ed.). Then I clarified, so who is in charge? Because my position involves working with a leader and in my understanding it is the leader who is and should be the main one. Kotin replied: "Now I am sitting in this chair, so I am."

What did the Kotin- Halushchenko team do worst of all over the past nine months? This is not even an economic damage, because in the future these losses can be made up and the company can be made profitable. But it will be extremely difficult to do this. Because they began to emasculate the middle management, which in any company is the basis of its activities.

Energoatom is a complex corporation, large, highly regulated because of its importance and because of the facilities that it operates. Nuclear scientists have a concept of “safety culture”. This is the basic philosophy of every nuclear scientist. This means that even if it is necessary to formally violate the law in order to comply with the safety culture, the nuclear scientist will do it, because safety is the most important thing. There are many laws, they are complex and often ambiguous. A safety culture is tied to precise physical laws. Unfortunately, the current leadership team at Energoatom has done a lot to emasculate the safety culture.

In the first part of the interview, Oleh Polishchuk, the former head of the Directorate for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption of the State Enterprise NNEGC Energoatom, Kosatka.Media told that now the company has a “conceptual” management regime, about the judicial prospects of his dismissal and the relationship with the acting president. President Petro Kotin.

Tags: NPP, corruption, NNEGC "Energoatom", electricity, electricity market, auctions

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